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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
This is an appeal from a decision of the trial court dated
April 6, 1990, Notice of Appeal filed on April 11, 1990 by
Intervenor and May 2, 1990 by Plaintiff-Appellant.

It is from a

final judgment under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
There are two separate appellants, Plaintiff personally and
as administratrix of the M.J. Hiltsley estate, Plaintiff and
Appellant, and the estate of Etta Wood, Intervenor and
Appellant.
RUTH HILTSLEYfS CLAIM
Plaintiff and Appellant Hiltsley claims that the judgment of
the trial court is contrary to the undisputed evidence before the
trial court, is contrary to the statutes of the State of Utah,

Utah Code Annotated, § 57-1-5, and decisions of this court
relating to the rights of tenants in common, namely Matter of
Estate of Gorrell. 765 P.2d 878 (Utah 1988), and Jollev v. Corrv,
671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983).

Trial court refused to recognize the

decision of Judge Croft awarding plaintiff Ruth Hiltsley judgment
in the amount of $4,924.66, which judgment has never been
overturned or on which there has been no contrary evidence
submitted since the trial before Judge Croft.

The court ignores

the law of res judicata and collateral estoppel as established by
the following cases:

Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689

(1978); WiLde v. Mid-Century Insurance Company, 635 P.2d 417
(1981); Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah
1983); and Baxter v. Department of Transportation, 705 P.2d 1167
(Utah 1985) ; Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758
P.2d 451 (1988); Noble v. Noble, 461 P.2d 1369

(1988).

ISSUE RELATING TO INTERVENOR ETTA WOOD'S ESTATE
Judgment of the trial court is contrary to the
uncontroverted evidence.

Evidence establishes without

controversy that Milton J. Hiltsley held assets of the estate of
Etta Wood in trust for said estate, which assets are now in the
possession of the defendant, Hallalene M. Ryder.
consideration for the Wood assets.

Ryder gave no

The following authorities

support the requirement that a resulting or constructive trust be
recognized on the assets in the possession of Hiltsley.

In the

Matter of the Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982); Baker v.
Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147
(Utah 1987) ; Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day-Saints v.
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Watson, 25 Utah 45, 699 P.531 (1902); Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah
16, 253 P.2d 440 (1953), Restatement of Law of Trusts, § 44 0,
Illustration (b) (2); Restatement of Restitution, Section 160; In
re Park v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (1983); Haws
v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 PI.2d 229 (1949); In re Swan's
Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 682 (1956).
The decision of the trial court refuses to recognize the
decision of Judge Croft in the same proceedings and failed to
recognize or apply the doctrine of res judicata or- collateral
estoppel contrary to the following decisions of this court:
Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (1978); Wilde v. MidCentury Insurance Company, 635 P.2d 417 (1981); Penrod v. Nu
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983); and Baxter v.
Department of Transportation, 705 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1985); Mel
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (1988);
Noble v. Noble, 461 P.2d 1369 (1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the third appeal of the above-entitled matter by
parties.

The first appeal was to this court by the defendant

Hallalene M. Ryder.

The decision of the court is reported in

Hiltslev v. Ryder, 738 P.2d, pg 1024 (Utah 1984).

Decision on

the second appeal by the Court of Appeals is Case No. 890181-CA,
dated September 27, 1989, unreported.
The original decision in this case by Judge Bryant Croft
ruled that the intervenor, Estate of Etta Wood, was entitled to
have a constructive trust impressed on assets in the possession
of M.J. Hiltsley, deceased, which were given by him during his
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lifetime to defendant Hallalene M. Ryder.

This court in its

decision made the following order, 738 P.2d, pg 1026:
Because the trial court should have required that Etta
Wood ! s estate be joined before deciding the case as it
did, we reverse the case and remand for joinder of Etta
Wood's estatec No costs awarded.
Note 5 adds the following to the decision:
In making this disposition, we in no way rule upon the
merits of the constructive trust issue. To do so would
be improper since the record was developed without
representation by Etta Wood's estate. However, for the
benefit of the trial court, we refer it to Ashton v.
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151-42 (Utah 1987), and Baker v.
Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636-37 (Utah 1984).
The trial court, J. Dennis Frederick, on motion of counsel
for defendant, dismissed the claim of intervenor and plaintiff
on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired while
the matter was on appeal to this court.

This decision was

reversed by the Court of Appeals in Case No. 890181-CA dated
September 27, 1989.
On the second trial, the matter was submitted to Judge
Frederick based on the record in the first trial, with the only
live witness who was a party being Hallalene Ryder whose
testimony was not different from the original trial.

At the

close of the trial Judge Frederick granted judgment in favor of
the defendant and against intervenor no cause of action.

Court

then granted judgment in favor of defendant and against the
plaintiff no cause of action on plaintiff's claim for judgment in
the sum of $4,924.66.
The basis of this judgment was a determination by the court
that there was no evidence presented that would enable the court
to determine that deceased Milton J. Hiltsley in any fashion
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exercised dominance, undue influence, or inappropriate influence
over Etta Wood or her property and that there was no evidence to
show in what capacity he received the money of Etta Wood and that
there was not sufficient evidence to impose a constructive trust
on the moneys in the various bank accounts.
The court also determined that there was insufficient
evidence to support the judgment granted by Judge Croft of
$4,924.66 to plaintiff Ruth Hiltsley.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The only party who was a witness at the trial before Judge
Frederick was defendant Hallalene Ryder.

Plaintiff Ruth Hiltsley

being too ill to come to court, the matter was submitted on the
basis of the record made in the first trial, with certain pages
referred to specifically relating to the interest of Ruth
Hiltsley and Ryder in the bank accounts into which the Etta Wood
money was indicated as having been deposited.

A photostatic copy

of the pages out of the diary of M.J. Hiltsley, deceased, is as
follows:
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Neither Ryder nor Ruth Hiltsley testified as to any
discussion with deceased M.J. Hiltsley about the Etta Wood
moneys.

The diary pages are all the evidence concerning receipt

by M.J. Hiltsley of the Etta Wood money.
Corroborating the entries in the diary and demonstrating
their accuracy are the records of the American Savings and Loan
account, Exhibit 43-P and Exhibit 5-P, which shows a deposit of
$10,000.00 on October 5, 1979, and the closing of the account on
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October 29, 1979 with the withdrawal of two items, one for
$1,489.21 and the other for $36,000.00.
The withdrawal of $1,489.21 is explained by Exhibit 43-P
showing a division of the amount between M.J. Hiltsley and Ryder
with a balance for transfer fees of $141.78 and the notation that
it was Melody's condo.
Judge Croft, in his analysis of the $36,000.00 paid into the
condo purchase price, analyzed the account as follows in his
memorandum, page 53-54 of the record on appeal:
As to the $3 6,000.00 paid on the purchase of
defendant's condo on the "Red Letter Day" of 10/5/79,
it is apparent, as set out supra, that $16,150.68
thereof was traceable from defendant's other bank
accounts. At trial it was stipulated by plaintiff's
counsel that the $1,000.00 paid as earnest money on the
purchase of the condo could be credited to defendant,
although as also noted supra, that amount is set forth
as an expenditure (on page 252 of Ex P-10) by Milton.
Since $10,000.00 of the $36,000.00 came from Etta's
money, $9,849.32 must be deemed to have come from
Hiltsley funds. Plaintiff's name was placed on that
account when opened on 10/1/79 under the names of "M.J.
Hiltsley and Ruth Hiltsley and H. M. Ryder". This
account was not set up as a joint tenancy account and
must be construed as a tenancy in common. However, it
does not seem just to say that plaintiff would thus own
one-third of the funds defendant deposited into the
account, nor would it be just to say that defendant
was, nevertheless, entitled to a one-thirty tenancy
interest in the $9,849.32 deposited therein by
Hiltsley. Although plaintiff's name was put on the
$3 6,000.00 check, she did not endorse it and knew
nothing about it until after Milton's death. Based
upon these facts I rule that plaintiff had an ownership
interest in one-half of the $9,849.32 so deposited, or
$4,924.66.
The title to the condo was taken in the name of Hallalene
Ryder and M.J. Hiltsley as joint tenants (see Exhibit 9-P).
Judge Frederick ruled that there was no evidence to support
a constructive trust.

He made no effort to trace the proceeds
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into the Ryder account as Judge Croft did.

Judge Croft's

decision concerning the tracing of funds has not been
controverted or even disputed to this point.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
CLAIM OF ESTATE OF ETTA WOOD
POINT I:

TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CORRECTLY APPLY
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO INTERVENOR'S CLAIM
CLAIM OF RUTH S. HILTSLEY

POINT I:

TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO APPLY
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO
HILTSLEY'S CLAIM

LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO BOTH CLAIMS
POINT I:

TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE
OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RECOGNIZE THE
DECISION OF JUDGE CROFT AS BINDING ON
THE COURT
ARGUMENT
CLAIM OF ESTATE OF ETTA WOOD

POINT I:

TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CORRECTLY APPLY
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO INTERVENOR'S CLAIM

The Utah Supreme Court over many years has applied the
doctrine set forth in the Restatement of Law of Trusts, § 440,
pg 393.

The section clearly applies to the facts of the Etta

Wood estate.

It reads as follows:

§ 440. General Rule
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and
the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting
trust arises in favor of the person by whom the
purchase price is paid, except as stated in §§ 441,442
and 444.
In subsection b., the Restatement states that the rule stated in
the section is applicable to transfers of personal property as
well as transfers of real property.
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As illustrations, it gives

the following as Illustration No. 2, pg 394:
2. A deposits money in a bank in the name of B. In
the absence of evidence of a different intention on the
part of A, B holds his claim against the bank for the
amount of the deposit upon a resulting trust for A.
The case closest on the facts relating to this matter is
Matter of Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982).

This was a

brother-sister relationship where the brother gave property to
his sister.

A purchase money trust was determined to exist.

The

court carefully considered the section of the Restatement of
Trusts as quoted and reviewed the prior Utah cases which
recognized the Restatement rule as applicable.

The language of

Matter of Estate of Hock, Id., pg 1115, reads as follows:
The general rule for the creation of a purchase money
resulting trust by operation of law has been set out in
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 440 (1959):
Where a transfer of properties is made to one
person and the purchase price is paid by another,
a resulting trust arises in favor of the person
by whom the purchase price is paid, except as
stated in §§ 441,442 and 444.
A similar formulation of this doctrine has been adopted
in Utah, Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372
(1953), and we have previously cited with approval
§ 440 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. Little v.
Alder, 19 Utah 2d 163, 428 P.2d 156 (1967). The fact which
must be proven in the case of a purchase money resulting
trust is that one party paid the purchase price for property
and another party was given legal title. The recitals in
the deed do not preclude evidence of the actual transaction.
Jackson v. Hernandez, Texas, 155 Tex. 249, 285 S.W.2d 184
(1956). Professor Scott in his treatise on trusts explains
the interworking of these factors:
If there ! s no evidence as to the intention of
the parties, other than the fact that A paid
the purchase price for conveyance to B, a
resulting trust arises in favor of A. It is
unnecessary for A to introduce further evidence
that the trust was intended, since the character
of the transaction itself raises the inference
that B was not to take the property beneficially.
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The court in Park v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590
(Utah 1983), was confronted with the problem of interpreting a
constructive trust claim and applied a section of the Law of!
Restitution and imposed a constructive trust on the estate of a
deceased wife in favor of her husband.
to present unjust enrichment.

The ruling was designed

The law concerning the imposition

of the constructive trust and applying § 160 of the Restatement
of Restitution, pg 640, reads as follows:
Section 160 presents the broadest possible application
of a constructive trust. It provides that a
constructive trust may arise "where a person holding
title to property is subject to an equitable duty to
convey it to another on the ground that he would be
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it . .
. .ff
Such breadth has also been described as follows:
Constructive trusts include all those instances
in which a trust is raised by the doctrines of
equity for the purpose of working out justice
in the most efficient manner, where there is
no intention of the parties to create such a
relation, and in most cases contrary to the
intention of the one holding the legal title,
and where there is no express or implied, written
or verbal, declaration of the trust.
In 1987 the court had a brother-brother relationship as far
as trustor and trustee is concerned in Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d
14 7 (Utah 1987).

A brother deeded property, with an oral

agreement on the part of the deceased brother to reconvey.
Court there cited as support for the creation of a constructive
trust Estate of Hock, Id., and Park v. Zions First National
Bank, and reviewed the prior decisions of the court.

It stated

in the following language that a constructive trust is an
equitable remedy which arises by operation of law to prevent
unjust enrichment, pg 599:

A constructive trust is an equitable
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remedy which arises by operation of law to prevent unjust
enrichment.

Accordingly, parol evidence may be introduced to

establish a constructive trust.
One of the interesting holdings in Ashton v. Ashtonf Id.,
which is applicable to the present facts is that the person into
whose hands the property on which a trust has been imposed was
not a bona fide purchaser.
trust.

Held transferee takes subject to the

The property was at the time of trial in the hands of the

deceased brother's widow.
In Ashton v. Ashton, Id., the court distinguishes the cases
where clear and convincing evidence is required from the cases
where parol evidence may be introduced to establish a
constructive trust.

It pointed out that where it is necessary to

alter a deed which is regular in form and presumed to convey
clear title, it is necessary to present clear and convincing
evidence, 753 P.2d 151.
Another case cited in the original decision in this case by
the court is Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983).

It is a

case where deeds were executed which had been recorded and in
place for many years.

It was a situation where no confidential

relationship existed between the parties nor were they related.
The clear language of Restatement of Trust, § 440, Id.,
recognizes without stating the rule set down in Rule 160 of the
Restatement of Restitution, Id., that to allow one party to keep
property without consideration is unjust enrichment.
presumption of a trust relationship arises.

A

The presumption is

rebuttable, but the burden of proof shifts to the person seeking
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to rebut the presumption.
Trial court erroneously believed, apparently, that it
required clear and convincing evidence to give rise to a trust.
This is a clear mistake of law.

Where there is no document that

must be varied or no written instrument whose terms are clear on
its face, clear and convincing evidence is not required.
The evidence is clear that deceased M.J. Hlltsley came into
possession of his sister's bank account and deposited it in his
own accounts.

There is no evidence that the sister intended to

give title to the brother or that she intended to make a gift or
otherwise transfer her interest.

The presumption of resulting

trust was not rebutted.
Transfer of the Etta Wood money was made during Etta's
lifetime on October 5, 1979 when the items were transferred into
the accounts of deceased.

The American Savings and Loan account

was then further used on October 29, 1979 to pay on the Ryder
condo, title to which was taken in the name of Ryder and deceased
M.J. Hiltsley as joint tenants.
It is the position of the intervenor that the evidence o|f
the receipt by deceased of the Etta Wood moneys is clear.
Deceased's own handwriting acknowledges this without dispute from
any oral or other written evidence.

His diary entries were

corroborated by the various transfers and entries that have been
demonstrated and on which Judge Croft relied in tracing the funds
from Etta Wood into the accounts in the name of deceased at the
time of his death and into the condo purchase price.
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Frederick
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erroneously interpreted the law.

He failed to apply the laws of

the State of Utah as set down in this court's decisions which
govern resulting trusts.

He refused to impose a resulting trust

on the funds received from Wood without consideration.
CLAIM OF RUTH S. HILTSLEY
POINT I.

TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO APPLY
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO
HILTSLEY'S CLAIM

Trial court failed to recognize the interest of Ruth
Hiltsley in the joint account which was used for the purpose of
purchasing the Ryder condo.

No evidence has been produced which

would in any way controvert Judge Croft's analysis of the moneys
that were in the American Savings and Loan account.

Defendant

Ryder was given credit for all of the deposits shown to have been
made by her into the account.

The estate of Etta Wood was

given credit for its funds deposited in the account.

The

balance was then determined to be the property of deceased and
his wife, Ruth Hiltsley, as tenants in common.
It is undisputed Ruth Hiltsley did not know that the funds
in the joint account were being withdrawn to purchase an interest
in the condo in which Ryder and deceased would be joint tenants,
R.P. 214.
The law is clear that a joint tenant who acts against the
interests of the joint tenancy breaks the tenancy.

In Tracy

Collins v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 301 P.2d 1086, the husband
mortgaged joint property owned by himself and his wife.
held that this severed the joint tenancy.
could be held for his debt.

It was

Only his interest

In Nelson v. Nelson, 592 P.2d 594,
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the court held that a joint tenant could sever the tenancy and
convert it into tenancy in common by giving a deed to his
interest in the property.

In First Security Bank v. Demiris, 10

Utah 2d 405, 354 P.2d 97, the wife, joint tenant, drew out the
full account in the joint account.
tenant, then died.

Her husband, the other joint

His estate was able to establish an interest

in the full account, since her withdrawal severed the joint
tenancy and the husband could then show ownership of the whole
account deposited from his independent funds.

In

Jolley v.

Corey, 671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983), the court held that a joint
tenancy could be severed by voluntary conveyance to a third party
and also could and would be severed by the involuntary
conveyance by judicial sale on foreclosure.
As Judge Croft ruled, the conduct of deceased severed the
joint tenancy in the American Savings account.

The parties were

then, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, owners of ct
one-half interest in said account by reason of the Utah statute
relating to joint tenancy and the requirement of equal interest.
See 57-1-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Judge Croft's analysis of the American Savings and Loan
account used to purchase the condo has never been attacked.
is submitted said analysis is accurate.

It

If anything, it is more

generous toward defendant and the estate of M.J. Hiltsley thah
would be required.
It is respectfully submitted that Ruth Hiltsley is entitled
to judgment for her share of the joint account which was used to
purchase the Ryder condo.

As demonstrated by Judge Croft, the
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amount is $4,924.66.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO BOTH CLAIMS
POINT I:

TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE
OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RECOGNIZE THE
DECISION OF JUDGE CROFT AS BINDING ON
THE COURT

Both appellants join in the proposition that the
determination by Judge Croft of the rights of the parties to the
funds that were in the hands of the deceased and disposed of by
him during his lifetime became a final disposition of this matter
when the Supreme Court did not reverse the decision of Croft and
remitted the matter for the joinder of Etta Wood's estate.
The doctrine of res judicata would probably apply in this
matter had it not been for the fact that the estate of Etta Wood
was not joined as a party in the action.
rights of all parties in his decision.

Croft determined the
Since the estate was not

a party, the doctrine applicable is that of collateral estoppel.
In numerous cases since 1978 this court has applied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel and distinguished it from the
doctrine of res judicata.

In 1978 the court decided Searle

Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), and set down the
difference between collateral estoppel and res judicata.

Since

that time there have been numerous cases that have applied the
doctrine.

Among them are Wilde v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 63 5

P.2d 417 (Utah 1981), Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah
1982), Schaer v. State, By and Through the Department of
Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), and Penrod v. Nu
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983).
Appeals Court have followed the court's rulings.
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Cases by the
See Copper

State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah 1987), Mel
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451
(Utah 1988), and Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988).
Since the earliest cases, the courts have repeatedly stated
that the rule of collateral estoppel is to preclude relitigation
of issues that were litigated and finally determined in prior
actions.
Judge Croft's decision, while returned to the trial court
for the joinder of Etta Wood's estate as a party, has never been
reversed or modified in its primary and fundamental holdings*
There has never been a claim made that he erroneously interpreted
the law or found facts which were not supported by evidence.
In the retrial, only the evidence originally submitted to
Judge Croft was reconsidered.

The only witness that was sworn

and testified who was a party was Melody Ryder.

Her testimony

did not differ from what it was in the Croft conducted trial.
Appellants submit that it would be an unusual situation if
one trial court was authorized to reverse a trial judge without
the same having been determined to be an erroneous opinion,
contrary to the evidence or law.
Ryder should certainly not be able to complain of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel being applied, since she was a
party to all of the litigation before Croft and could have made
any claim that she had to the assets that were being considered
by the court.

At no place in the testimony or evidence is there

any claim by Ryder that she has some interest in the moneys that
came from Etta Wood into the hands of deceased M.J. Hiltsley.

-17-

She received in Croft!s decision a fulL award of her contribution
to the condo purchase price.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of Judge
Croft was correct and correctly applied the law applicable to

the claims

of intervener and plaintiff.

Appellants

submit

that

this court should order that his opinion be reinstated, that the
judgment entered by him in the above-entitled action be affirmed,
and that intervenor, as a party, be granted the judgment that he
determined to be due it,
DATED this

day of

, 1990.

KING & ISAACSON, P.C.

DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Undersigned certifies that three copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellants were mailed to DeLyle H. Condie, McKay,
Burton, Thurman & Condie, Attorneys for Defendant, 500 Kennecott
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133, by placing the same in the
United States mail,

postage prepaid,, this

1990.

-18-

day of June,

